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Fisch: Environmental Law - The Role of FDF Variances in Implementing the

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-The Role of FDF Variances in Implementing the Clean Water Act's Toxic Pollutant Discharge Provisions.
Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 1102 (1985)
1
In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Water Act by adding section
301(1).1 That section states that "[tlhe administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency] may not modify any requirement of this section
is on the toxic pollutant list
as it applies to any specific pollutant ' which
3 Subsequent to the enactment of
under section 1317(a)(1) of this title.
section 301(l), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued regulations which set the maximum allowable levels for the discharge of
pollutants.4 The regulations contained a fundamentally different factor
(FDF) variance provision, for dischargers of toxic pollutants.
The FDF variance ensures that EPA's standards for various categories of industries 6 do not unfairly burden an individual discharger. If
obtained, the FDF variance exempts the discharger from the preset national standards. However, the variance is not easily acquired. A mere
showing that compliance is difficult or extremely burdensome will not suffice to secure an FDF variance. The discharger must show and EPA must
agree7 that the factors considered by EPA in setting the discharge levels
fundamentally differ from those applicable to the discharger seeking the
variance. Among the factors considered are plant size and location, land
availablity, processing method, and cost of pollution control in relation
to the same costs of other dischargers in the category."
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) immediately challenged the FDF variance provision. Their argument was twofold. First,
NRDC claimed that all FDF variances from pretreatment standards were
illegal because they were not statutorily authorized. Second, they argued
that FDF variances from pretreatment standards violated the newly
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enacted section 301(l). EPA maintained that an FDF variance was not
a modification. The agency concluded that the 301(l) prohibition against
toxics applied only to modifications under subsections 301(c) and 301(g).9
The Third Circuit agreed that section 301(l) barred the variance and
decided the case in NRDC's favor without reaching the question of the
statutory authorization of FDF variances.10 In a five to four decision, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and found for
petitioners EPA and the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)."
The Court held that the statutory language of section 301(l) did not
foreclose EPA's interpretation of the law, because the Agency's view was
sufficiently rational and was set forth in the absence of a clear congressional mandate forbidding FDF variances for dischargers of toxic wastes."
The Court found that EPA's construction of section
301(l) was consistent
with the Clean Water Act's goals and operation.13
The previous role of FDF variances as applied to the Clean Water Act
and their applicability to the discharge of toxic pollutants are examined
in this casenote. The relatively scant legislative history of section 30 1(1)14
is surveyed and shows that Congress knew little or nothing about FDF
variances when the 1977 amendments were enacted. Scrutiny of the relationship between section 30 1(1) and the FDF variance clause indicates that
section 301(l) was intended to preclude such modifications. First, a look
at previous caselaw and the legislative background is in order.
BACKGROUND

In 1972, Congress responded to growing environmental consciousness
with sweeping amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
These amendments became known as the Clean Water Act because of their
ambitious goal of eliminating all pollution discharged into U.S. waters
by 1985.11
The 1972 Clean Water Act placed an onerous burden on EPA. EPA
was required to prescribe regulations setting permissible pollutant
discharge levels for industry. With some prodding,' 6 EPA began to pro9. National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. Environmental Protection Agency, 719 F.2d
624, 645 (3rd Cir. 1983), rev'd sub noma. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 105 S.Ct. 1102 (1985). Subsections 301(c) and 301(g) are codified at 33 U.S.C. §§
1311(c) and 1311(g) (1982). See infra notes 35, 48 for an explanation of these provisions.
10. National Ass'n of Metal Finishers,719 F.2d at 646.
11. The original suit brought by NRDC was against the EPA, with CMA intervening
on behalf of the EPA. Id at 636.
12. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 1102,
1112 (1985).
13. Id
14. The legislative history of section 301 is extensive, but as to this particular subsection, Congress was generally silent.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
16. NRDC sued the EPA for delinquency in setting the nationwide standards. A consent decree came out of this litigation which placed EPA on a rigid timetable to promulgate
standards for 21 categories of industries. A list of 65 toxic pollutants were also placed on
the timetable in this decree. See NRDC v. Train, 8 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C.
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mulgate the regulations. The first two steps required direct dischargers 17
to meet standards set according to the "best practicable technology
available" (BPT)'8 by July 1, 1977. By July 1, 1983,19 dischargers were
required to meet more stringent standards which were set according to
the "best available technology" (BAT. 20
In the 1977 amendments, Congress sanctioned a similar two tiered
scheme for indirect dischargers.2 They also ordered a "major redirection
and refinement"2 2 of the regulatory program to focus on the control of
toxic pollutants. 2 At this time, section 301(4)was added to the Clean Water
Act. Although FDF variances had been applied to the earlier BPT standards, EPA did not include an FDF variance clause for the pretreatment
standards of indirect dischargers until 1978.24
The first United States Supreme Court case that dealt at least
peripherally with FDF variances was E.. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 25 decided shortly before the passage of section 301(4. The main issue
in du Pont was whether or not section 301 authorized EPA to limit waste
discharges by existing plants through industry wide regulation, rather
than on a plant-by-plant basis (as the chemical industry desired). The
Court 26 held that EPA does have the authority to set uniform effluent

limitations for classes and categories of industry. 27 The Court added that
industry wide regulations were appropriate "so long as some allowance
is made for variations in individual plants, as EPA has done by including
a variance clause in its 1977 [BPT] limitations. '28 In dictum the Court
said that "consideration of whether EPA's variance provision has the
proper scope would be premature." 29 The only other mention of variances
is the Court's declaration that EPA's variance clause is applicable only
to the 1977 BPT limitations. 3 0 In a related issue, the Court also held that
for the "new source" standards (those set for plants not yet built), FDF
1976), modified sub noma. NRDC v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833 (D.D.C. 1979),
modified sub. noma. NRDC v. Gorsuch, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2013 (D.D.C. 1982), modified
sub nom. NRDC v. Ruckleshaus, 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1953 (D.D.C. 1984).
17. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1982).
19. For certain categories of industry this deadline was again extended anywhere from
one to three years. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1982).
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1982). BAT requirements are the industry wide standards
set according to the "best available technology economically achievable." In every category,
BAT limitations are stricter than the earlier BPT requirements.
21. H.R. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-90 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4356-65. See supra note 4.
22. COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977 326-27 (Comm. Print No. 14, 1978) [hereinafter
LEGIS. HISTORY].

23. See supra note 16 and accomanying text.
24. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1984). For a definition of indirect dischargers, see supra note
4 and accompanying text.
25. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).

26. This 8-0 decision was delivered by Mr. Justice Stevens.
27. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 136.

28. Id. at 128.
29. Id. n.19.
30. Id. at 122-23.
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variances were inappropriate and would not be allowed.' For reasons that
will be seen in the dissent's analysis of the instant case, these last two
points are crucial.
DuPont was considered a victory for environmental groups because
industry could no longer obtain individual standards but was subject to
the nationwide regulations promulgated by EPA. The Court realized that
setting standards for every point source3 2 would be too cumbersome to
implement33 and would compound already existing water pollution
problems.

In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court again examined variance provisions
and their relationship to the Clean Water Act. In EnvironmentalProtection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Association,3 4 the trade association vigorously argued that the economic capability of a discharger should
be considered as an important factor in reviewing requests for FDF
variances. Industry pointed to section 301(c) 35 of the Clean Water Act and

asked that the same flexibility present in section 301(c) be applied to FDF
variances.
Rejecting this notion, the Court looked at the statutory language of
section 301(c), which called for "reasonable further progress '36 toward
eliminating pollutants. The Court believed this meant that section 301(c)
was only intended to apply to the more stringent BAT standards, which
anticipated that some progress would already have been made by meeting
the BPT standards.

37

The Court concluded that financial capability of the

38
discharger was not to be considered in the FDF process.

These decisions, although validating FDF variances in general, did
not address the specific question of whether or not such a variance is permissible in light of section 301(l). The Fourth Circuit, in AppalachianPower
Co. v. Train,39 was the first court to address this specific question.40 The
court found section 301(l) to be ambiguous on the issue of whether
31. Id at 138.
32. A point source is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance... from which
pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982). A point source is any
individual polluter.
33. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 132-33.
34. 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1982). Subsection (c) allows the Administrator (of EPA) to modify
the standards for particular dischargers who can show that the best pollution control within
economic capability is being employed. Subsection (c) was enacted in 1972, and it is an effort to protect business interests experiencing great difficulty in legitimately trying to comply with the law.
36. Id (emphasis added).
37. Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Association, 449 U.S.
64, 75 (1980). Applications for a section 301(c) modification were not even fileable until after
July 1, 1977, the date by which BPT limitations were to have been met. This also suggests
that section 301(c) was only applicable to BAT standards.
38. Id. at 85. This 8-0 decision was delivered by Mr. Justice White.
39. 620 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1980).
40. The Clean Water Act calls for direct review of its provision in the United States
Court of Appeals and not the Federal District Courts. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1982).
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or not it applied to FDF variances. The court therefore deferred to EPA's
interpretation that FDF variances were permissible for dischargers of
toxics.4 '
42
The instant case was the next litigation in this controversy. In a
direct clash with the Fourth Circuit, the Third Circuit held that:

Because we find that § 301(l) is clear, we must disagree [with the
Fourth Circuit]. Section 301(l) forbids modifications and FDF
variances are no less modifications than those provisions indisputably prohibited by that section. Given the clear Congressional concern throughout the 1977 Amendments for discharges
for toxic polluof toxic pollutants, we hold that FDF variances
43
tant discharges are forbidden by the Act.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve this conand to decide this important quesflict between the Courts of Appeals
44
tion of environmental law."

THE PRINCIPAL CASE

The Court considered the possible ramifications of a literal reading
of section 301() and expressed its fear that a verbatim interpretation would
an erprohibit EPA from amending its own standards or from correcting
5 The Court
requirements.
based
technology
the
calculating
in
ror made
concluded from this that the word "modify" lacks plain meaning in section 301(l) and that the 46statute was the proper subject of construction
by EPA and the Court.
The Court then examined the relatively sparse legislative history of
301(c) 47
section 301(l) in relation to two companion amendments, sections

and 301(g). 48 The Court observed that the Senate proposed amending sec-

tion 301(c), to prohibit the economic capability waiver for toxic pollutants.
waiver, with
The Senate bill also added section 301(g), the water quality
49
the same proviso for toxic pollutants as in section 301(c). The Conference
Committee, without explanation, added section 301(/) and deleted the toxics prohibition from section 301(c). This became the final 1977 version of
the section 301 amendments.
41. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 620 F.2d 1040, 1048 (4th Cir. 1980).
42. National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. Environmental Protection Agency, 719 F.2d
624, 646 (3rd Cir. 1983), rev 'd sub nom. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 105 S.Ct. 1102 (1985).
43. Id at 646.
44. Chemical Manufacturers, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 1107 (1985).
45. Id at 1108.
46. Id at 1110.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1982). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (1982). Subsection (g), added in 1977, calls for a modification
if the modified discharge level will not adversely affect receiving water quality and will not
place any additional requirements on downstream dischargers or treatment plants.
49. Id
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Relying heavily on a House floor statement made by Representative
Roberts, 50 the Court believed these changes indicated an intent only to
forbid section 301(c) and 301(g) modifications.5 ' The Court also stated that
du Pont notified Congress of the FDF variance process.52 The Court concluded from this that congressional silence on the full scope of section
301(l) showed that Congress did not intend to preclude FDF variances.53
The Court echoed CMA's argument that an FDF variance does not
excuse compliance but is merely an individual standard for a point source
whose relevant factors were not sufficiently considered when establishing
the discharge levels.5 4 The Court pointed out that the FDF variance
mechanism eases EPA's burden and allows it to promulgate nationwide
standards, while addressing individual, atypical dischargers at a later
date.5
Part of the Court's holding is a restatement of the holding in Chevron,
Inc., U.S.A. v. NaturalResources Defense Counci4 Inc.,5 6 which calls for
considerable deference to an administrative agency's statutory interpretation, if Congress has not clearly spoken to the issue.5 7 The agency's view
need not be the only permissible one but must be "sufficiently rational
...to preclude a court from substituting its own judgment for that of
[the agency]." 58 Since the majority found congressional intent to be lacking, they deferred to EPA's interpretation of section 301(l) and reversed
the Court of Appeals.
ANALYSIS

NRDC argued that the language of the statute clearly and explicitly
precludes FDF variances. Section 301(l) states that "[tihe administrator
may not modify any requirement of this section. . . . 59 The majority's
analysis failed to confront the statutory language. The Court's focus was
extremely selective when analyzing the congressional intent behind section 301(l).
The legislative history shows that both House and Senate members
used the words "waiver," "variance," and "modification" interchangeably.
Representative Roberts, for example, used the word "waiver" when speak50. Representative Roberts, the house floor leader for the bill, said:
Due to the nature of toxic pollutants, those identified for regulation will not
be subject to waivers from or modification of the requirements prescribed under
the section, specifically, neither section 301(c) waivers based on the economic
capability of the discharger nor 301(g) waivers based on water quality considerations shall be available.
Chemical Manufacturers, 105 S.Ct. at 1109.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1111-12.
Id. at 1112.
104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984), cited in Chemical Manufacturers, 105 S.Ct. at 1108.
Chevron, 104 S.Ct. at 2782.

58. Chemical Manufacturers, 105 S.Ct. at 1108.

59. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1982) (emphasis added).
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60
ing of both toxic and conventional pollution control. The Senate report
on the 1977 amendments stated that "[in order to re-emphasize that
modifications to BAT are intended for non-toxic pollutants only, the bill
prohibits variances for toxic pollutants.'16 Senator Muskie, the Senate
floor leader for the bill, stated in a Conference Committee hearing that

"[for] toxic pollutants ...

there are no waivers or modifications ....

*"62

The synonomous use of these words indicates that Congress did not
understand EPA's distinction between modifications and FDF variances.
It may also suggest that Congress was not totally aware of FDF variances
when debating the 1977 amendments.
The du Pont decision, which the Court says must have put Congress
on notice of FDF variances,6 3 supports this conclusion. The dispute in du
Pont centered on the 1977 BPT limitations, and the words "fundamen64
tally different factor" only appeared in a footnote to the opinion. Only
after du Pont did EPA draft FDF clauses for BAT and pretreatment standards. Even if Congress was aware of FDF variances after du Pont, it
knew of them only to the extent that they applied to the earlier BPT limitations. The drafters of the 1977 Amendments would have had to be clairvoyant to anticipate that FDF variances would be promulgated for the
later and stricter BAT and pretreatment standards.
The Court also concluded that Congress was put on notice of FDF
variances by an NRDC spokesman's testimony before a Congressional
6
The spokesman said that a" 'fundamental variance prosubcommittee5.
vision' was integral to the Act's system of 'national, uniform minimum
effluent limitations'. ""This single misnomered reference to FDF variances
constitutes minimal notice to Congress. Considering the many people who
testify before congressional committees, and the many pages of transcripts
that the committee members review, it stretches the bounds of reason
to say that one incorrect reference to FDF variances puts Congress on
notice that the variance will be applied to BAT and pretreatment standards. Congressional silence on whether or not section 301(l) applies to
FDF variances reflects Congress's ignorance of FDF's rather than
demonstrating its knowledge and awareness of the provision.
Surprisingly, the Court agreed with EPA that a literal interpretation
of 301(l) would lead to problems in correcting errors or promulgating
stricter standards. 61 EPA had claimed that a literal interpretation of sec66
tion 301(l) would render the administrator "powerless " to amend the standards. The Court could have easily reached the same result without
60. LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 22, at 305.
61. Id. at 676-77.
62. I& at 458.

63. Chemical Manufacturers,105 S.Ct. at 1109.

64. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 123 n.10.

65. Chemical Manufacturers,105 S.Ct. at 1109 n.17.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 1108.

68. Brief for United States Environmental Protection Agency at 16, Chemical Manufac-

turers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 1102 (1985) [hereinafter
EPA's Brief].
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accepting this specious argument. Section 501(a)69 of the Clean Water Act
grants the administrator authority to prescribe "such regulations as are
necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter. ' 70 This overall
proviso indicates that the Adminstrator is not powerless in his rulemaking authority. Merely to advance its own untenable position, EPA has
manufactured a conflict where no conflict exists.
The legislative history disposes of this issue. Nowhere, when speaking of modifications, waivers, or variances did any member of Congress
question EPA's authority to promulgate the nationwide standards or to
revise them periodically. 7' Congress spoke of modifications or waivers for
particular dischargers and never questioned EPA's power to amend the
regulations in light of improved technology or the discovery of errors.
Thus, EPA's argument on this account is superficial and overly dramatic.
The language of the 1977 amendments rebuts EPA's interpretation
of section 301 (1). The final version of section 301(c) contains no provision
as to toxic pollutants. Yet the final revision of section 301(g) contains its
own subclause which makes 301(g) modifications unavailable to toxic
dischargers. 71 It is logically inconsistent to maintain that the 301(l) ban
applies only to 301(c) and (g) modifications, when section 301(g) already
contains its own toxics prohibition. While this does not necessarily forward NRDC's position, it indicates that EPA's interpretation is incorrect. Just as Congress was silent about the exact scope of 301(l), so too
was the Court silent in answering this logical fallacy.
Nor does EPA answer this contention. EPA simply says, "[in our
view, the prohibitions... were consolidated into a separate section 301(1)
for stylistic purposes." 73 One can readily question whether any federal
statute is drafted merely for purposes of style. Conciseness and specificity are generally the goals of legislative draftsmanship.
CMA makes a similar argument, saying, "it was decided that, rather
than repeating the identical limiting clause at the end of [sections 301(c)
and 301(g)] . . .the limitation would be placed into a separate section
301(l)." 1 The dissent noted that nothing was decided, but that Congress
did not discuss the reasons for the addition of 301(1).1- The dissent pointed
out that "if cleaning up the statutory language was in fact the objective
of the changes, the Conference Committee was remarkably unsuccessful

at doing

So."76

69. 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (1982).
70. Id
71. See generally LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 22.
72. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(c), 1311(g) (1982).
73. Reply Brief for United States Environmental Protection Agency at 9, Chemical
Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 1102 (1985).
74. Brief for Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n at 9, Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 1102 (1985).
75. Chemical Manufacturers,105 S.Ct. at 1117 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and O'Connor.
76. Id.
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The dissent identified the distinction between the BPT limitations and
the stricter BAT and pretreatment standards. BPT limitations were set
for the regulation of "point sources"7 7 and not classes or categories of industry. The pretreatment standards pertaining to the present case are
set for categories of industry by nationwide regulation. This distinction
is crucial because of the du Pont holding. Du Pont dealt with regulations
(the BPT limitations) set for point sources and held the variance applicable
only to these standards.7 8 The other portion of the du Pont holding addressed regulations set by nationwide standards, the so-called "new
source" standards. The Court held that FDF variances were not mandated
by these standards and were in fact impermissible.7 9 This strengthens the
argument that FDF variances are not applicable to the nationwide
pretreatment standards at issue in Chemical Manufacturers.
The majority and dissenting opinions agree on the mandate of
Chevron. Courts should defer to an agency's construction of a statute
where Congress has not clearly expressed its will8 0 The controversy in
this case, however, concerns whether or not Congress has sufficiently
manifested its intent. Since Chevron posed no obstacle to the dissent's
analysis of the present case, it will probably not become a touchstone for
courts dealing with the administrative construction of a statute. The battle
will always rage on the field of congressional intent.
Practicality and necessity are EPA's best arguments for allowing FDF
variances. The FDF variance is a useful tool in implementing the industry
wide standards, given the rigid timetable of the NRDC consent decree.,
There would be a critical time problem if EPA evaluated every point source
in a given industry. In the vast process of setting national pollution standards, some dischargers will be overlooked. In some cases, fundamentally different factors will not be considered in setting the national standards.
This is EPA's basic rationale for the variance. The FDF variance is an
effort to avoid placing a disproportionate burden on one discharger.
While these goals are laudable, they only address the question of what
constitutes good policy. The central issue, however, is what constitutes
the will of Congress. The Court addressed this in Crushed Stone and said,
"Congress anticipated that the 1977 regulations would cause economic
hardships and plant closings .... "82Speaking specifically of the toxic pollutant problem, Representative Roberts said that Congress realized the 1977
regulations would cost industry "millions of dollars and result only in a
little more clean-up of our waters.' '83 Congress agreed that there was no
room for compromise with toxic pollutants 4 and that dischargers who
could not meet the standards would be forced to close, with resulting
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1982).

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

d Pont, 430 U.S. at 123.
Id at 138.
Chemical Manufacturers, 105 S.Ct. at 1121 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 83.

83. LEGIs. HISTORY, supra note 22, at 305.

84. Id. at 549.
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damage to our economy. Water pollution issues invariably pit economic
interests against environmental well being. In 1977, Congress intended
that industry make serious concessions in addressing the problem of toxic pollutants.
Even though EPA has the power to grant FDF variances, it is exercised sparingly. The variance is only available to plants which fulfill all
the fundamentally different factor criteria. By the end of 1977, only 5 of
over 4000 major industrial dischargers had applied for FDF variances and
only two variances had been granted. At the time of argument in the present case, only two additional variances had been granted. According to
5
EPA estimates, approximately forty FDF requests are still pending.
These statistics suggest that water pollution problems may not be seriously exacerbated by the FDF variance process.
CONCLUSION

Considering EPA's limited use of FDF variances, and assuming that
FDF variances will not be radically expanded in scope, this decision poses
no grave threat to water quality. Despite the Court's error in Chemical
Manufacturers,the use of this administrative tool will probably not cause
widespread environmental degredation.
By allowing EPA's unorthodox and illogical interpretation of section
301(l) to stand, however, the United States Supreme Court deferred to
an improper statutory construction. Once again, congressional silence on
a particular issue allowed an administrative agency to substitute its own
judgment for that of the legislature. Had Congress known of EPA's intended expansion of the FDF variance, it would have passed more specific
legislation to overcome such an administrative maneuver with respect to
toxics.
FREDRICK L. FISCH

85. THESE STATISTICS, NOT IN DISPUTE BY NRDC, ARE DERIVED FROM EPA's BRIEF, supra
note 68, at 36. All of these variances have been issued to direct dischargers only. This may
be due to the fact that indirect dischargers readily affect treatment plants that process water
for human consumption.
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